


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## A Methodology for Monitoring and Control Network Design

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


# Content

- Introduction
- Risk assessment procedure
- Optimal security-aware network design
- Experimental assessment
- Conclusions

# Introduction – ICS – the core of CI

- Architecture includes the cyber and physical domains.
  - Physical layer: sensors, actuators.
  - Cyber layer: Transmitters, PLC, SCADA servers, HMI, communication infrastructure.




# Overview of the proposed technique

- Measure the impacts of various cyber threats on the physical equipment.
- Summarize the impact values and determine a risk value for each cyber device of the ICS.
- Group the devices in a predefined number of security groups.
- Make the communication links to the concentrator nodes (switch, router, firewall, IDS) as desired by the security requirements.


# Cyber risk assessment

- How to measure the risk values associated with physical process/equipment?




# Cyber attack impact assessment

- How to measure the effects of cyber incidents on physical process/equipment?



# Optimal security-aware network design

- Minimize End device - Concentrator node (switch, router, firewall + IDS) distances and maintain performance & **security constraints**.



# Optimal, security-aware network design

- ILP problem
- Some mathematics
  - (10) – connection constraint
  - (11) – security constraint
  - (12) – link capacity constraint

Cost function

$$\min \left( \sum_{i \in \mathcal{C}} \sum_{j \in \mathcal{D}} [(x_i^{\mathcal{C}} - x_j^{\mathcal{D}})^2 + (y_i^{\mathcal{C}} - y_j^{\mathcal{D}})^2] \cdot \nu_{ij} \right), \quad (9)$$

With the following constraints:

$$\sum_{i \in \mathcal{C}} \nu_{ij} = 1, \forall j \in \mathcal{D}, \quad (10)$$


$$s_{j\kappa}^{\mathcal{D}} \cdot \nu_{ij} \leq s_{i\kappa}^{\mathcal{C}}, \forall i \in \mathcal{C}, j \in \mathcal{D}, \kappa \in \mathcal{S}, \quad (11)$$

$$\sum_{j \in \mathcal{D}} \xi_j^{\mathcal{D}} \cdot \nu_{ij} \leq \zeta_i^{\mathcal{C}}, \forall i \in \mathcal{C}, \quad (12)$$




# Experimental assessment


- IEEE 14-bus electricity grid
  - (a) Pure risk values;
  - (b) Risk values enforced in 3 groups with different security levels;
  - (c) Risk assessment dendrogram.



(a)




(b)




(c)

# Experimental assessment

- IEEE 14-bus electricity grid
  - (a) unconstrained;
  - (b) constrained by the link capacity of C5.




(a)




(b)

# Experimental assessment

- Tennessee Eastman chemical plant
  - (a) Pure risk values;
  - (b) Risk values enforced in 3 security level groups




(a)




(b)

# Experimental assessment

- Tennessee Eastman chemical plant
  - (a) with initial parameters;
  - (b) with C3's security level changed to 1;
  - (c) Objective function's optimal values for different number of CN.




Legend	
Node	Sec.
C1	Level 1
C3	Level 2
C2	Level 3
D5	Level 1
D11	Level 2
D2	Level 3




# Experimental assessment

- IEEE 300-bus large-scale electricity grid
  - (a) Pure risk values;
  - (b) Risk values enforced in 3 security groups.



(a)




(b)

# Experimental assessment

- IEEE 300-bus large-scale electricity grid
  - (a) electrical topology<sup>1</sup>;
  - (b) communication infrastructure with 50 CN.



(a)



(b)

<sup>1</sup>P. Hines, S. Blumsack, E. Cotilla Sanchez, and C. Barrows. The topological and electrical structure of power grids. *In System Sciences (HICSS), 2010 43rd Hawaii International Conference on*, pages 1-10, Jan 2010.

# Conclusions

- We developed a methodology for the optimal design of industrial networks.
- The approach relies on a risk assessment technique and an optimization problem to minimize connection distances, while enforcing security and capacity requirements.
- The preliminary studies and the experiments revealed the importance of considering cyber security in the design phase of ICS.

Thank you!



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